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The US Investigation into the Darfur Crisis
and the US Government’s Determination
of Genocide
Samuel Totten
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
This article examines the genesis and implementation of the Atrocities
Documentation Project initiated by the US State Department as well as the US
government’s determination that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur, Sudan,
between late 2003 and August 2004. In doing so, the author considers and analyzes
the rationale for the investigation and the reasoning for the genocide determination, as given by various US officials. He also delineates and discusses the
perceptions of various scholars vis-à-vis the same issues, noting that many of the
latter suspect there were ulterior motives behind the genesis and implementation of
the investigation as well as the genocide determination. Finally, the author
discusses the positive aspects of the investigation and the potential negative
ramifications of the genocide determination.

Introduction
In July and August 2004, the US Department of State sponsored a field investigation,
the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP), whose express purpose was
to ascertain whether genocide had been and/or continued to be perpetrated in Darfur.
By that point, the Darfur crisis had been declared ‘‘the worst humanitarian disaster in
the world’’ by Jan Egeland, the UN under secretary for humanitarian affairs;1 the
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience had issued a
genocide warning vis-à-vis the killings and death in Darfur; and both the US House of
Representatives and US Senate had declared the situation to be a case of genocide.
Following an analysis of the data collected by the Darfur Atrocities Documentation
Team (ADT), Secretary of State Colin Powell declared, on 9 September 2004, in a
statement to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that genocide had been
perpetrated in Darfur.
In the year and a half since the investigation and subsequent declaration by
Powell, heated debate has erupted over the true motives and value of the ADP as well
as over the validity of the genocide determination. Some have asserted that while
crimes against humanity have been perpetrated in Darfur, genocide has not. What
follows is a discussion of the stated purpose, methodology, and findings of the ADP, as
well as the debate over the motives behind the project and the determination of
genocide by the US government.

Purpose, Location, Methodology
As noted above, during the late summer of 2004, the US Department of State
undertook an investigation to assess whether government of Sudan (GoS) troops and/
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or the Janjaweed (Arab militia) had committed genocide against the black African
population in Darfur. As Stephen Kostas notes,
By all accounts, Andrew Natsios’ frequent warnings of a growing humanitarian crisis in
Darfur first alerted the US Department of State to the gravity of the situation there.
Natsios, head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
made nine trips to Sudan between late 2003 and spring 2004 and repeatedly warned
key officials at the State Department that conditions were grave and deteriorating.2

Continuing, Kostas reports,
During early 2004, [Lorne] Craner, Assistant Secretary for the State Department’s
Bureau of Democracy, held regular intelligence briefs with the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [Pierre-Richard]
Prosper [then US ambassador-at-large for war crimes, who had previously served as the
prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) case against
Jean-Paul Akayesu and obtained the first conviction for genocide in an international
court] recalls that ‘‘as we moved into the spring of 2004, it became a little clearer,
at least from the information that was emerging from our people as well as NGOs
[non-governmental organizations], that there was a deliberate targeting and killing of
the African population.’’3

Significantly, the ADP was the first official investigation by one sovereign nation
(the United States) into the internal strife of another sovereign nation (Sudan) for the
express purpose of ascertaining whether genocide had been perpetrated or not.4 Under
the auspices of the US Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor (DRL), the Coalition for International Justice (CIJ), an NGO, was hired to
recruit the investigators and to coordinate the investigation on the ground. Ultimately,
twenty-four investigators from around the world formed the ADT. The areas of
expertise and backgrounds of these investigators were eclectic; the investigators
included, for example, an expert in the field of sex crimes and international law;
a prosecutor for the US Justice Department (who had also served as a prosecutor for
the ICTR); a New York City district attorney (who had worked as an investigator
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]); two
experts on genocide; and a detective from London who had served as an investigator
with the ICTY.
Upon their arrival in Abeche, a desert town in the far reaches of eastern Chad, the
investigators were briefed by both CIJ and USAID personnel on the then current
situation in Darfur and the status of the refugee camps in Chad. Additionally, they
were given several hours of training. The US State Department’s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) provided a detailed discussion of the research
methodology and questionnaire devised for the investigation, emphasizing throughout
the significance of conducting a systematic study with a random selection of
respondents. The training also included a tutorial by a female police officer from the
United States (who had also worked as an investigator with the ICTY) on interviewing
victims of sexual assault. As each investigator would have his or her own interpreter
who spoke Arabic, English, and one or more tribal languages, a session on working
with interpreters was provided, conducted by a professor of linguistics, an expert on
translation and working with translators, from the University of Stockholm.
Following the training session, teams of investigators were dispersed to informal
settlements and UNHCR refugee camps lining the Chad side of the Chad/Sudan border
which housed black African refugees forced from their villages in Darfur by GoS troops
and/or the Janjaweed. As noted in the State Department’s report on the ADP,
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‘‘a plurality of the respondents were ethnic Zaghawa (46 percent), with smaller
numbers belonging to the Fur (8 percent) and Massalit (30 percent) ethnic groups.’’5
Once in the field and ready to conduct interviews, each investigator and translator
selected a section of the camp and counted off every tenth tent. If more than one adult
(eighteen years of age or older) was present, a method of randomly selecting the
interviewee was used and the person selected was asked if he or she was willing to be
interviewed. (Few people declined to be interviewed, and when they did it was
generally due to being extremely, if not gravely, ill or when engaged in work that had
to be completed. In such a situation, the interviewer and interpreter moved on to the
next occupied tent and the process of selection was repeated.) Once a person agreed to
be interviewed, the rest of the people in the immediate area were politely asked to
leave until the interview had been completed. This precaution was taken to enable
respondents to answer the interview questions as honestly and openly as possible,
without pressure or interference from family members or others.
All investigators used the eight-page Darfur Refugees Questionnaire, developed
in Washington, DC, via a collaborative effort involving members of various nongovernmental organizations (including the CIJ), the American Bar Association, and
staff from the State Department.6
Initially, the investigator asked his or her interpreter to introduce himself (the
translator), then the investigator. Then, through the interpreter, the investigator
delineated the purpose and focus of the interview. The interviewee was informed that
the investigator was there to speak with him or her about his or her experience in the
Darfur region of Sudan and that his or her name, identity, and responses would
remain confidential. The investigator also informed the interviewee that participation
in the project did not, in any way, guarantee compensation for that which had been
stolen from him or her, nor did it guarantee that he or she would be asked to press
charges against an alleged perpetrator or to testify at any future trial(s). Finally, each
interviewee was informed that he or she should only agree to be interviewed if he or
she truly wanted to be, as participation was totally voluntary and there would be no
repercussions for choosing not to participate.
The interviewer began by seeking such information as the name, age, ethnic group,
and years of schooling of the respondent. Subsequently, interviewees were asked to
locate, on a series of maps provided for the investigators by the State Department, the
town, village, or settlement from which they had been forced. Next, the interviewees
were asked about when and why they had left their homes; if they had been harmed
(and, if so, how); if other members of their family or their village had been harmed or
killed (and, if so, who and how); if any property had been stolen from them or destroyed
(and, if so, exactly how many cows, camels, goats, donkeys, chickens, bags of grain and
seed, etc.); if their abode and/or village/settlement had been destroyed, partially or
completely; if specific groups of people had been singled out for denunciation and/or
brutality (and, if so, who and in what way(s)); if any members of their immediate
family, extended family, and/or fellow villagers perished on the way to the refugee
camp or settlement in which they were now residing in Chad (and, if so, who and how);
why they thought they had been attacked and forced from their homes; and if, on the
journey to Chad, they had witnessed or heard about other attacks on people and
villages.
The interviews lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours; the average was
about one hour. During the course of each interview, the investigator asked follow-up
questions in order to have the respondents clarify and elaborate on points and to move
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from the general to the specific (e.g., if four attackers entered a home, were they
members of the GoS and/or Janjaweed? What were the attackers wearing, and did they
have any particular insignia on their uniforms or any noticeable marks, such as
tattoos, scars, or disfigurements, that might help to identify them later?).
At the conclusion of each day, the investigators completed a one-page ‘‘preliminary
atrocity field coding sheet’’ that included some thirty-six items or ‘‘event codes’’
(e.g., witnessed an immediate family member being killed; had been wounded; heard
any racial epithets, and if so, what they were; had livestock stolen from him/her, and,
if so, what kind and how many of each; witnessed aerial bombing; experienced
destruction of personal property, and, if so, what; experienced the looting of personal
property, and, if so, what; was personally raped; witnessed others being raped;
witnessed a shooting in home village). Additionally, there were about twelve
‘‘perpetrators codes’’ (e.g., GoS troops, Janjaweed, other).

Findings
Ultimately, the State Department statistically analyzed 1,136 interviews conducted
during the month-long ADP. Following the compilation and analysis of the survey
data,7 State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that ‘‘analysis of the
refugee interviews points to a pattern of abuse against members of Darfur’s non-Arab
communities.’’8 More specifically, the interviewees reported personally witnessing or
experiencing the following: killing of family member (61%); killing of non-family
member (67%); shooting (44%); death from displacement (28%); abduction (25%);
beating (21%); rape (16%); hearing racial epithets (33%); village destruction (81%);
theft of livestock (89%); aerial bombing (67%); destruction of personal property
(55%); and looting of personal property (47%).9
Significantly, the State Department report notes that ‘‘numerous credible reports
corroborate the use of racial and ethnic epithets by both the Jingaweit and GOS
military personnel: ‘Kill the slaves! Kill the slaves!’; and ‘We have orders to kill all the
blacks’ are common.’’10
With respect to those who carried out the attacks against the black Africans and
their villages, the refugees’ responses indicated the following: ‘‘both the Janjaweed
and the GOS military (48%); the GOS alone (26%); the Janjaweed alone (14%) and
unknown (12%).’’11

The Factors Resulting in the Genocide Finding
Once the study was completed, the findings and analysis were turned over to US
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper and US Secretary of
State Colin Powell. Kostas, who interviewed Prosper in order to ascertain how the
United States arrived at its ‘‘genocide determination,’’ reports that ‘‘Craner and
Prosper presented the State Department’s approach as dispassionate and clinical.
The purpose was ‘to make a pure decision’—a ‘clean legal and factual analysis’ free
of policy considerations—[. . . and in doing so they] ‘analyzed the facts with the breadth
of the law in mind—meaning, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes . . .’’’.12
Through a series of wide-ranging telephone conversations and meetings (between
Powell and Prosper and between Powell and various assistant secretaries within the
State Department) in which the participants compared and contrasted the findings of
the ADP with the wording in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), it was gradually determined that genocide had been,
and possibly continued to be, perpetrated in Darfur.
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In speaking with Kostas and Eric Markusen during the course of a telephone
interview, Prosper noted that he and Powell had had a long and detailed discussion
regarding the important but always sticky issue of ‘‘intent’’ (i.e., the intent of the
perpetrators). Among the issues they discussed were ‘‘‘how they [the GoS] created
these militias [the Janjaweed]; how they [the GoS] had the ability to rein them [the
militias] in and then did not; how they [the GoS troops] acted in concert with the
Janjaweed . . . in attacking these [black African] villages . . . the aerial bombardment
and then Janjaweed would come in; and then the fact that the government of Sudan
would block humanitarian assistance to people in need.’’13 The aforementioned actions
(and, in certain cases, failures to act) led the State Department to infer genocidal
intent.
Prosper also spelled out the factors State Department officials considered in
coming to their determination of genocide, among the most significant of which were
the following:
 the villages of the black Africans were attacked and destroyed, while nearby
Arab villages were not;
 a large number of men were killed, while a large number of women were raped;
 the means to existence, such as livestock and water, were, respectively, killed
and polluted; and
 the GoS prevented both medical care (and medicine) as well as humanitarian
assistance from being delivered to the internally displaced persons camps,
where people were dying from a lack of food, water, and medical attention.14
Ultimately, Powell, Prosper, and the other State Department personnel involved in
the determination ‘‘concluded that there was a deliberate targeting of the groups with
the intent to destroy.’’15 Speaking about the latter, Prosper stated that while
examining and discussing the concepts of unlawful killing and the causing of serious
bodily and mental harm, any of which constitutes an act of genocide under the UNCG,
the real one that got us . . . was the deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to
destroy the group in whole, or in part. . . . [With respect to the situation in the IDP
camps, Prosper and Powell could not find any] logical explanation for why the Sudan
government was preventing humanitarian assistance and medicine [into the camps]
other than to destroy the group.16

Kostas notes that ‘‘the government of Sudan was seen as offering unbelievable excuses,
leading Powell to conclude that there was a clearly intentional effort to destroy the
people in the camps who were known to be almost exclusively black African.’’17
Finally, and tellingly,
Prosper’s experience as a prosecutor supported his understanding that genocidal intent
could be inferred from the evidence as well as proved by express statements. As Prosper
explains, Powell and he asked each other if the government of Sudan was not
committing genocide then ‘‘What else are they trying to do?’’ ‘‘What else could their
intent be but to destroy this group?’’ First, Powell and Prosper looked at the
coordination and collaboration between the government of Sudan and the Jinjaweid.
Then, Powell and Prosper examined how the government acted once they were shown to
have knowledge of the perpetrators of violence, the targeting of black African tribes,
and the scale of human destruction in Darfur. This part was most convincing: The
government of Sudan ‘‘had knowledge across the board. Let’s pretend that it wasn’t
coordinated. They knew what was going on and not only did they do nothing to stop it,
they intentionally obstructed assistance that would have bettered the situation. So
when you have knowledge, you take no steps to stop it, and then when people are trying
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to help you block the assistance, what else could you want other than for these people to
die or to be destroyed?’’18

On 9 September 2004, in testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that, ‘‘based on a consistent and
widespread pattern of atrocities (killings, rapes, the burning of villages) committed by
the Janjaweed and government forces against non-Arab villagers,’’ the State
Department had concluded that ‘‘genocide has been committed in Darfur and that
the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and genocide may
still be occurring.’’19 Continuing, Powell stated that
 the United States was continuing to press the GoS to rein in the Janjaweed and
that the GoS needed to ‘‘stop being complicit in such raids’’;20
 the United States continued to strongly support the work of the AU monitoring
mission in Darfur, and, in fact, ‘‘initiated the Mission through base camp set-up
and logistics support by a private contractor’’;21 and
 the United States had also called for an ‘‘expanded AU mission in Darfur
through the provision of additional observers and protection forces’’ and
‘‘identified $20.5 million in FY04 funds for initial support of this expanded
mission.’’22
Then, acting under Article VIII of the UNCG,23 Powell reported that the United
States was calling on the United Nations to initiate a full investigation into the
situation in Darfur. In doing so, he said, ‘‘We believe in order to confirm the true
nature, scope and totality of the crimes our evidence reveals, a full-blown and
unfettered investigation needs to occur.’’24
Finally, Powell concluded his statement with these words:
Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to
take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by this determination (emphasis
added). We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese government to act
responsibly. So, let us not be preoccupied with this designation of genocide. These
people are in desperate need and we must help them.25

Strengths and Limitations of the Investigation, the Genocide Finding,
and Action Based upon the Genocide Finding
The strengths of the ADP were many. More specifically, a methodologically sound
study resulted from the thought, effort, and expertise put into the development of the
questionnaire and the way the investigation was carried out. As part of the
methodology, every one of the twenty-four investigators asked the same set of
questions listed on the questionnaire and documented the findings using the same
coding methods. The number of interviews conducted was large enough to result in
statistically significant findings. Also, ‘‘the final data set used for the Documenting
Atrocities in Darfur report represented three successive waves of data entry.’’26 More
specifically, as Jonathan Howard, an analyst with the US Department of State’s Office
of Research, reports,
As successive teams of interviewers rotated through Chad, the Office of Research hired
an international public opinion research company to create a data set from the
remaining questionnaires. [T]he company’s team of professional coders read each
questionnaire thoroughly, verifying and correcting if necessary the interviewer’s field
codes. In all three rounds of data entry, a fifth of the questionnaires were randomly
selected and recorded by an additional analyst to ensure accuracy in the coding process.
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Each questionnaire’s demographic information, event codes and attendant information
were entered into the data set. Every questionnaire was entered by two different data
entry specialists, or double-punched, to verify that the correct information had been
entered. Once the two data entry specialists separately entered the data from a
questionnaire, a computer compared the two and flagged any discrepancies.
From the final data set, two databases were created. The first was the respondent
database, in which each line of data represents an individual refugee with all related
demographics and event codes for that refugee. 1,136 refugees are represented in the
refugee database. The respondent data set was used to generate the atrocity
percentages in the final report . . .
Because each respondent may have experienced the same event multiple times—
numerous refugees had experienced several attacks during their journey to Chad—
during the analysis stage it was necessary to write a syntax to prevent the statistical
software from counting multiple events towards the total for the survey population . . . .
A second event database was also created in which the multiple events from each
refugee’s story were separated so that each line of data in the event database reported a
single event. 10,304 events are represented in the event database. . . . From the outset,
the team decided to adopt a conservative approach to reporting the data collected
during the documentation mission. To this end, during all three stages of data entry,
events were coded as either eyewitness or hearsay. Eyewitness events were those
reported to have been directly witnessed by the respondent, while hearsay events took
place outside the respondent’s presence. The atrocity statistics eventually reported
reflected only events reported as eyewitnessed by the refugees.27

The efforts of the State Department’s people on the ground in Chad and those involved
in the analysis of the data were seemingly impeccable. Indeed, State’s personnel were
serious, hardworking, dedicated, and demanding. From the outset, they seemed
determined to collect and analyze the data in the most methodologically sound and
accurate manner possible. Furthermore, the study resulted in findings that are
statistically significant.28
Be that as it may, the investigation had certain weaknesses and limitations. First,
the most obvious limitation is that the investigation was conducted solely in Chad,
rather than Darfur and the refugee camps in Chad. Had the ADP been given access to
both those black Africans in IDP camps in Darfur and those who remained in any
villages not destroyed (and, for that matter, to those Arab villagers who were not
attacked but may have witnessed the attacks on the black Africans), the data would
have been much richer. Entry into Darfur for the purpose of an investigation was not,
it seemed, an option—or, at least, not one that the US government wanted to pursue
at the cost of either totally alienating the Sudanese government or being rebuffed.
Second, the respondent pool was largely limited to refugees from the westernmost
states of Darfur, as well as those who, for the most part, had the shortest distance to
travel to Chad. Again, the data would have been richer had the investigators been able
to interview a wider swath of the black African population in Darfur. Third, as the
interviews were being conducted in the first two weeks of the ADP, various
investigators found that they were collecting information about certain categories/
codings not listed on the questionnaire (e.g., questions about disappearances, sexual
violence other than rape, separation by gender, targeting of the elderly, rebel activity
in and/or near the villages). As a result, the coordinators of the ADP passed on such
concerns and suggestions to other investigators spread out along the Chad/Sudan
border. The question that remains is this: Were the other investigators informed
in a timely manner about the additional categories? If not, did the investigators,
of their own accord, add additional categories where they saw fit? If only some
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of the investigators added additional categories, then the information collected in
new categories would be incomplete. That said, the major categories that the
State Department used to make the determination of genocide were included on
the questionnaire every investigator used, and thus the latter concern did not
have much bearing, if any at all, on the final determination of genocide. Finally,
the process of delineating the data on the questionnaires could have been much
more detailed (and uniform) had the investigators been directed to write up the
most detailed narratives possible, as opposed to delineating the findings, as
many did, in an outline format in which they highlighted and, in various cases,
succinctly commented on key points.
According to sources within the US State Department, the final determination of
genocide was arrived at in a methodical and deliberate manner whereby the evidence
gathered during the investigation was compared to the exact wording and concepts
delineated in the UNCG. Be that as it may, numerous scholars have called into
question the motive(s) behind the determination of genocide. Some have not only
questioned these motives but questioned, or attempted to refute, the validity of the
determination.
Prior to highlighting some of the many debates surrounding the motives and
validity of the determination, this author (one of the twenty-four ADP investigators,
and one who believes that the determination of genocide was the correct one to make)
wishes to raise some issues already alluded to in this article. Earlier comments quoted
here indicate that the Bush administration felt pressed to display its concern over
Darfur. For example, as Kostas notes, ‘‘U.S. policy in Sudan was already of special
interest to the Bush administration, and had an important domestic constituency: the
evangelical Christian community. Evangelicals had taken an interest in the plight of
black Christians in southern Sudan and there was a growing left–right coalition on
Darfur.’’29 Furthermore, as Lorne Craner has explained, ‘‘the Bush administration was
eager to point to its leadership on Sudan policy to demonstrate that they could speak
with authority on grave issues of human rights at a time when issues around the
treatment of detainees, particularly at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, threatened to
strip the administration’s voice of legitimacy on human rights issues.’’30 These
comments raise several questions: Was the determination of genocide truly as
‘‘dispassionate and clinical’’ (cum ‘‘apolitical’’) as some within the Bush administration
claim? Was there possibly a bias going into the investigation that genocide would be
found (or, at the least, was there, as strange as this sounds, an ardent hope that it
would be found?), and did that somehow tip the scale in favor of such a determination?
And was there already a plan that, if a genocide determination was made, the White
House would simply pass the matter onto the UN, thus being able to claim, as it did,
that the United States need not do any more than it had already done? At this point,
such questions are simply that: questions; however, they do merit further examination
and study. It should be duly noted that these questions are raised here not to
question the validity of the determination of the genocide but to acknowledge that
there may have been certain factors at work that favored a particular determination—
that is, a certain propensity in favor of making such a determination versus not
doing so.31
A host of other questions also come to mind. In ‘‘A Problem from Hell’’: America
and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power reports that after being elected and while
reading about the Clinton administration’s failure in Rwanda, George W. Bush ‘‘wrote
in firm letters in the margin of the memo: ‘NOT ON MY WATCH.’’’32 Power goes on to
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comment that ‘‘While he [George W. Bush] was commander in chief, he was saying,
genocide would not recur.’’33 While Bush has obviously reneged on the promise he
made to himself, it is possible that he may have thought that by declaring genocide
(something the Clinton administration failed to do regarding Rwanda—that administration, in fact, as is well known, even went so far as to warn its officials/bureaucrats
not to use the so-called g-word), his administration was, at least in part, taking the
high road.
Alex de Waal, an expert on the Sudan, has raised two questions about the genocide
determination, and his own responses to each of these questions further complicates
the issue of the possible motive(s) behind that determination:
Is the U.S. government’s determination that the atrocities in Darfur qualify as
‘‘genocide’’ an accurate depiction of the horrors of that war and famine? Or is it the
cynical addition of ‘‘genocide’’ to America’s armoury of hegemonic interventionism—
typically at the expense of the Arabs? The answer is both. The genocide finding is
accurate according to the letter of the law.34 But it is no help to understanding what is
happening in Darfur, or to finding a solution.
And this description merely serves the purposes of a philanthropic alibi to the U.S.
projection of power.35

In addressing the political nature of the determination of genocide, de Waal
asserts that
The 9 September [2004] determination is the first time the Genocide Convention has
been used to diagnose genocide (rather than prosecute it). . . . What does the U.S.
determination signify? At one level, it is the outcome of a very specific set of political
processes in Washington, D.C., in which interest groups were contending for control
over U.S. policy towards Sudan. In this context, the call to set up a State Department
inquiry into whether there was genocide in Darfur was a tactical manoeuvre destined
to placate the anti-Khartoum lobbies circling around Congress (an unlikely alliance of
liberal journalists and human rights advocates, and the religious right), while buying
time for those in the State Department committed to pushing a negotiated
settlement. . . . 36
But at another level, the genocide determination reveals much about the U.S. role in
the world today, and the unstated principles on which U.S. power is exercised. Those
principles are shared by both the advocates of U.S. global domination and their liberal
critics, and are revealed in the commonest narrative around genocide, which takes the
form of a salvation fairy tale, with the U.S. playing the role of the savior.37
. . . For six decades, Americans have been dreaming of redeeming that historic fatal
tardiness, and dispatching troops in time to save the day. Their failure to do so in
Rwanda and Bosnia ten years ago sparked another round of soul searching and led
directly to the Kosovo bombing campaign and the Darfur genocide determination.38

De Waal’s criticism that the 9 September determination was the first time the
UNCG had been used to diagnose genocide, rather than to prosecute it, is, to my mind,
misplaced. Indeed, it seems to me that using the UNCG for the purpose of diagnosing
genocide should, at least when done seriously and conscientiously, be praised rather
than criticized. (Furthermore, the findings of the ADP led the United States to refer
the matter to the United Nations, and the latter, following its own investigation,
referred the matter to the International Criminal Court. As a result, the ICC is now
conducting an investigation into the atrocities in Darfur for the express purpose of
bringing suspected perpetrators to trial. Thus, in fact, the ADP has contributed to the
current effort to bring the perpetrators to trial.) Indeed, why should the UNCG not be
used to diagnose genocide? If and when it can serve that purpose, then it should do so.
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Too often scholars, political analysts, activists, politicians, and the media posit guesses
(some of them wild) as to whether or not a crisis constitutes genocide, and that is
problematic. Is it not better to gather solid data—granted, preferably early on, and
certainly much earlier than the United States did vis-à-vis Darfur—prior to making a
determination? This is not to say that the international community should wait until
a genocide determination is made to act to halt mass killing. Indeed, whenever any
threat or actual outbreak of mass killing takes place, then strong, effective measures
should be taken to halt it immediately. Surely, however, an accurate determination is
preferable to guesswork.
As for de Waal’s point that the pressure to establish a State Department
investigation was ‘‘a tactical manoeuvre destined to placate the anti-Khartoum lobbies
circling around Congress . . . while buying time for those in the State Department
committed to pushing a negotiated settlement,’’ a question that comes to mind is, What
is the evidence for such an assertion? If, though, even for the sake of argument, one
assumes de Waal is correct, then a further question arises: Just how significant is his
point? First, it is almost a given that most countries will attempt to negotiate a
settlement before resorting to military means. And, generally, this is a good idea. That
said, negotiating with actors that are intransigent and not likely to negotiate in good
faith is not only a waste of time but unconscionable when large numbers of people are
being killed during the negotiation process. As we now know, the ongoing attempt to
negotiate with both the GoS and the rebel groups has largely proved fruitless.
Furthermore, it quickly became apparent that ‘‘talk’’ by the international community
served, once again, as a substitute for action, and at the same time the killing and the
dying (as a result of both murder and genocide by attrition) in Darfur continued
unabated. That was, and is, unconscionable. It seems that a better target for de Waal’s
criticisms would have been the incessant talk carried out by the international
community, rather than the implementation of the ADP.39
Undoubtedly, intervention to halt the killing would have been preferable (at least
to some) to the ongoing negotiations that got nowhere but that was not in the cards for
the United States, in light of its ongoing ‘‘war against terrorism’’ in Afghanistan and
Iraq. That is, it is dubious that the Pentagon would readily—or, for that matter,
begrudgingly—have agreed to send troops into another potential quagmire, especially
when the armed services were already having difficulty recruiting enough personnel
for the war in Iraq. Over and above this fact, the so-called Somalia Factor still haunts
many within the US government.40 Finally, some prognosticators have also ventured
that, in light of the US–Sudanese collaboration on the ‘‘war on terror,’’ the Bush
Administration would not countenance an intervention that would put such
cooperation at risk.
If de Waal is correct that the ADP was used as a ploy to stave off criticism while
focusing on negotiations, it is also true that governments are not known for acting in
the most altruistic manner possible. It is also a fact that governments act for a
multiplicity of motives, some more—and some less—altruistic than others. Also, except
in totalitarian states, governments are not monolithic entities, and some branches or
departments may address issues and make decisions that are not necessarily shared
by, or in accord with, other branches or departments. Aside from all is it so grievous if
the ADP was initiated under pressure, and not for the best of reasons? Is that any
reason to dismiss an investigation that was handled in a highly professional manner
and resulted in a methodologically sound analysis? At the very least, the United States
was doing something besides talking.41
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Another possible motive behind the ADP, which de Waal does not take into
consideration, was the fact that sanctions had been threatened time and again by the
UN but were never carried out, and thus they soon became little more than ‘‘paper
tigers.’’ This continued to happen even when the United States introduced resolutions
aimed at Sudan only to have them watered down by various members of the UN
Security Council, purportedly to avoid ‘‘upsetting Khartoum.’’ The point is that it is
just as likely that the US carried out the ADP, as Craner suggests,42 in the hope of
moving the international community to action. If so, this could hardly be construed as
a questionable or despicable aim.
De Waal is undoubtedly correct that the Darfur crisis did release, as he says,
‘‘another round of soul searching.’’ But is that necessarily bad? I would submit that it is
not. Would de Waal, one wonders, prefer the opposite reaction?
Granted, some critics of the ADP have inferred that the ADP was largely a
cosmetic action—something fairly innocuous in the place of real action.43 This is
possible. But, then, who would have thought that a finding of genocide would
constitute an innocuous action? Certainly not such actors as Natsios and Craner, the
two prime movers behind the ADP. Still, the fact is that, sadly, in many ways—and
particularly in light of the lack of action by the United States to truly push the
international community to halt the killing and death—the assertion that it was
largely cosmetic is difficult (if not impossible) to refute. Again, the only saving grace is
that the finding of the ADP has led to the ICC’s current attempt to bring the
perpetrators to trial. Be that as it may, that has done virtually nothing to protect the
victims of the GoS and the Janjaweed over the past year and a half.
De Waal’s assertion that the United States conducted the investigation in order to
enact a ‘‘salvation fairy tale’’ so that it could play ‘‘the role of the saviour’’ is, at least
in one sense, so outlandish as to be utterly absurd.44 Possibly many at the State
Department and some within the executive branch felt that the investigation
constituted a kind of salvation affair, but in the long run no one, it seems, including
Powell and Bush, could conclude that the United States, in any way whatsoever,
played the role of savior—and that is true for the simple but profound reason that the
United States did the very minimum it could to prevent the killing and rape of the
black Africans of Darfur. The minimum this side of doing nothing, that is.
De Waal sees the determination of genocide as even more problematic than the
motive(s) behind the investigation, and this is because, as he puts it, ‘‘the fact that the
group labelled as genocidaire in this [the Darfur] conflict are ‘Arab’ is no accident.’’45
More specifically, he asserts that
There’s no covert masterplan in Washington to brand Arabs genocidal criminals, but
rather an aggregation of circumstance that has led to the genocide determination. It has
special saliency in the shadow of the U.S. ‘‘global war on terror,’’ misdirected into the
occupation of Iraq and seen across the Arab and Muslim worlds as a reborn political
Orientalism.46
After 11 September 2001, the U.S. sees Muslim Arabs as actual or potential terrorists
targeting the homeland. After 9 September 2004 . . . Arabs (and perhaps all Muslims too)
are actual or potential genocidaires, and their targets are Africans. It’s sad but
predicable that too many Africans will fall for this trap and that the brave efforts of the
African Union to build a continental architecture for peace and security will be impaled
on an externally constructed divide.47

The latter argument is likely to attract considerable debate. One must, at the
least, question the validity of his assertion and argument in light of the fact that
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the Bush administration has reached out to the GoS, an Arab-run government, for help
in its fight against terrorism. More specifically, in May 2005, the CIA flew Salah Gosh,
head of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service, to CIA headquarters in
Langley to confer with top CIA administrators. At the time, the CIA must have known
that Gosh was enmeshed in the Darfur crisis and was likely issuing directives to GoS
troops and the Janjaweed.48 The point is that to paint the United States with such
large swaths of opprobrium is somewhat misdirected—and, some would no doubt
claim, sorely so.
It must also be pointed out, however, that the relationship between the United
States and Sudan in the so-called war on terror raises the very real issue of just how
much pressure the United States is really willing to place on the Sudanese
government. Desperate for allies on the anti-terrorism front, the United States is
highly unlikely to risk losing out on major assistance in the area of intelligence
gathering, especially in an area as ‘‘fecund’’ as Sudan.
Howard Adelman, a philosophy professor who has written extensively about
genocide and issues of intervention, is another who vehemently disagrees with the US
determination of genocide and has also raised a host of questions regarding the
motives of the United States. Among some of the many questions he has raised are
these: ‘‘What influence did the desire not to repeat American inaction on Rwanda have
on characterizing Darfur as genocide?’’, ‘‘What was the influence of the Christian lobby
on the resolutions?’’, and ‘‘What was the influence of the immanence [sic] of the 2004
election?’’49
There is no point in repeating the discussion above as to whether the United States
had honorable or ulterior motives in carrying out the investigation. As for Adelman’s
criticism of the determination, he cites all the actors who were and are in disagreement
with it (e.g., the United Nations, the European Union, Doctors without Borders) and
asserts that the atrocities and other actions constitute, at worst, crimes against
humanity. Over-reliance on the UN Commission of Inquiry’s findings, however, seem
ill advised.50
As for Doctors without Borders, Adelman asserts that such a reputable group,
whose leader called for an intervention early on during the 1994 Rwandan genocide
and whose personnel have been on the ground for extended periods in Darfur, should
be duly recognized when it claims that genocide has not been perpetrated in Darfur.
But that is dubious advice for numerous reasons. First, Doctors without Borders has
never conducted its own investigation to ascertain whether or not the crisis in Darfur
constituted genocide. Second, Doctors without Borders did not provide empirical, let
alone conclusive, evidence to support its pronouncement. Third, Adelman has a
relatively close relationship with the African Union and has previously asserted that
he believes calling for an international intervention undermines the will and efforts of
that organization. Ultimately, only he can know how his association with the African
Union affects his stance on how to categorize the atrocities and deaths in Darfur.
One of the fiercest critics of the determination of genocide by Powell and Bush was
(and continues to be) Professor Eric Reeves of Smith College in Northampton,
Massachusetts. In fact, Reeves agrees with the determination; his caustic criticism is
the result of the lack of action that has followed. In a piece entitled ‘‘Secretary of State
Colin Powell’s Genocide Determination: What It Does, and Doesn’t, Mean for Darfur,’’
Reeves asserts that ‘‘by arguing in yesterday’s testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the obligation to ‘prevent’ genocide entails so very little,
Powell has done what his State Department spokesmen have done for months; he has
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made it less likely that the Genocide Convention will ever be used as a tool to serve the
primary purpose for which it was created.’’51 Continuing, Reeves argues that
Powell’s genocide determination may actually signal the end of the Genocide
Convention as a tool of deterrence and prevention. For if a finding of this sort,
rendered in light of the most conspicuous evidence of ongoing genocide, prompts no
action, then the precedent created during yesterday’s Senate testimony by the US
Secretary of State is wholly unfortunate.
The insistence that, despite a genocide finding, ‘‘no new action is dictated’’ reflects in
part US impotence at the UN, a function in many ways of diplomatic capital expended
on the war in Iraq. Indeed, under questioning by Senators on the Foreign Relations
Committee, it became painfully clear that the new US draft resolution being circulated
at the UN Security Council is not so much a draft as a plea. The purposed resolution is
vague, without a clear or explicit threat of sanctions, and establishes no meaningful
new benchmarks for Khartoum.52
This provides a certain ghastly clarity in the new world of the 21st century: even
genocide, even the crime that defined the actions in Rwanda and Eastern Europe
during the Holocaust, does not entail any special response or effort of prevention. If this
indeed marks the end of any particular obligations under the Genocide Convention, we
may legitimately wonder whether the price paid for Powell’s determination is not
exorbitantly high.53

Reeves is certainly justified in his disappointment in and criticism of the US assertion
that it had done all it could do for the targeted population in Darfur and its subsequent
lack of action following the determination. Indeed, once the US government declared
that Sudan had committed genocide, the United States, aside from providing hundreds
of millions of dollars, did the minimum it could (i.e., referring the matter to the UN
Security Council) without totally losing face. Furthermore, its justification that it had
done everything it could do was not only disingenuous but a brazen lie. Be that as it
may, Reeves’s assertion that Powell, and thus the United States, had ‘‘made it less
likely that the Genocide Convention will ever be used as a tool to serve the primary
purpose for which it was created’’ is, or so it seems, nothing short of hyperbole. Of
course, only time will tell if Reeves is correct, but ‘‘ever’’ is a long time. Even if the
international community takes another hundred years or more to act in good faith
when it comes to genocide and make effective use of the UNCG to prevent or halt
genocide, then all will not have been for naught—and it will ‘‘prove’’ that Reeves’s
statement is, in fact, hyperbole. Nevertheless, one can certainly empathize with his
sense of utter disappointment and share his dismay at the disastrous impact that the
United States’ timid and unconscionable response not only will have on the black
Africans of Darfur but is likely to have on the wide range of other groups that will,
inevitably, face major human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and
genocide, in the near and the distant future.
As for Reeves’s criticism of Powell’s assertion that ‘‘no new action is dictated,’’
Powell, of course, was talking about any action by the United States. Legally, Powell
was absolutely correct. Be that as it may, many are bound to find Powell’s, and the
United States’, position morally questionable, at best. Others are likely to counter that
preventing and/or halting genocide should be a shared responsibility and not
something to be left to a single nation, no matter how powerful. Still, when all is
said and done—and not even taking into consideration the possibility of unilateral
intervention—Reeves is correct in asserting that the United States could have done far
more than it did.
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Reeves is also highly critical of the lack of ‘‘teeth’’ in the resolution that the United
States submitted to the UN Security Council. As Reeves puts it, ‘‘What is most striking
about Powell’s testimony concerning the proposed US resolution for the Security
Council is its utter lack of enforcement provisions.’’54 One can hardly argue with
Reeves’s grievance, and I see no point in doing so. Again, the ‘‘actions’’ (or lack thereof)
following the genocide finding left a lot to be desired, and that is a major
understatement. And, in the past year and a half since the declaration, such lack of
action is what has caused the greatest consternation among critics of the US
government’s approach to Darfur.
Finally, Reeves blasts the US government for its tardy response to the
ongoing crisis:
Powell . . . attempt[s] to suggest that the State Department responded in a timely
fashion to the threat of genocide. This is not true. Ample evidence was available at the
end of 2003, clearly suggesting that genocide was occurring (by December 2003 the
nature of the fall offensive by Khartoum and the Janjaweed became fully evident).
Human rights reports, alluded to at one point in Powell’s testimony, were filled with
details suggesting that genocide was unfolding. Certainly by February of 2004, as
attacks on the African tribal populations of Darfur again dramatically increased, there
was more than enough evidence to justify a genocide investigation. And yet the State
Department deployed an investigative team only in July, almost half a year later. This
was shamefully belated action—shamefully.55

Reeves’s criticism is both fair and justified. The investigation could—and should—
have taken place earlier. A government truly dedicated to genocide prevention would
have seen to that. That said, to bring to fruition such an investigation is not within the
purview of any single individual within a government, and thus it takes considerable
time to move such an idea through the necessary channels. One must also take into
account the fact that there was a lot of infighting within the Department of State over
Darfur, and it no doubt took a great deal of effort and time to overcome objections to
such an investigation. This is not, in any way whatsoever, to condone the tardiness of
the investigation, but simply to acknowledge the reality of how governments work.
Such a reality underscores the need to establish a strong anti-genocide regime that is
buffeted as little as possible by partisan politics and realpolitik. Currently, however,
that is solely a goal and dream of genocide scholars and many human rights activists—
and, skeptics, of course, might venture that it is little more than a utopian idea. Again,
time will tell.
Gérard Prunier, an expert on East Africa, the Horn, Sudan, and the Great Lakes
of Africa and the author of Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide, has also weighed
in on the motives of the investigation, the genocide determination, and the
aftermath of the latter. With respect to the motive(s) behind the investigation,
Prunier seems to suggest that the ever-increasing pressure—from constituents,
non-governmental organizations, Congress, and others—for the US government
to act may have prompted Bush to support a ‘‘genocide investigation’’ into the
Darfur crisis:
On 1 June 2004 the members of Congress who sympathized with the SPLA sent
President Bush a list of twenty-three names of Janjaweed supporters, controllers and
commanders who were either members of the GOS or closely linked to it. The message
was clear: do something about these people. President Bush seemed to have been
embarrassed by the implicit demand, all the more because supporters of the antiKhartoum legislation tended to be more ‘‘on the left’’ (in so far as this political category
has relevance in US politics) within both parties and within the fairly tight Black
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Caucus. President Bush could not be expected to care too much about ‘‘the left,’’ but
unfortunately for him there was a core group of anti-Khartoum activists at the opposite
end of the political spectrum, from where he drew most of his electoral support. Many
fundamentalist Protestant organizations had rallied to the anti-Khartoum lobby
activated by Nina Shea. Then by mid-2004 vocal Jewish groups such as the
Committee for the Holocaust Memorial [sic] in Washington had joined in the indignant
chorus of protests about Darfur. The President thus found himself under pressure from
an array of public opinion elements too wide to be ignored during an election year. But
since the ‘‘realists’’ in the intelligence community kept insisting that Khartoum was too
important to be harshly treated, these contradictory pressures led the White House to
compromise on all fronts—supporting the Naivasha negotiations, [and] not putting too
much practical pressure on Khartoum but nevertheless passing legislation which could
be used as a sword of Damocles in case of non-compliance . . . 56

Continuing, Prunier drops a bombshell of sorts, especially if the assertion is true:
‘‘This author was assured that Secretary of State Colin Powell had practically been
ordered to use the term ‘‘genocide’’ during [his] high profile 9 September 2004
testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations but that he [had] also been
advised in the same breath that this did not oblige the United States to undertake any
sort of drastic action, such as a military intervention.’’57 Prunier’s source for the latter
assertion is a ‘‘confidential interview with a high-ranking member of the US
administration, [in] Washington [in] October 2004.’’58 It is certainly possible, of
course, that Powell had received a ‘‘push’’ in that direction. Be that as it may, there are
three sticking points in the statement. First, it comes from an unidentified source and
cannot readily be followed up. That, of course, does not mean it is not true, but it does
complicate matters. Second, Prunier uses the words ‘‘practically been ordered.’’
So Powell, ostensibly, was not ordered but was strongly encouraged, pressured,
prodded, or goaded to do so. Third, Prunier uses the word ‘‘advised.’’ Being ‘‘advised,’’
of course, is not the same as being told, directed, or ordered to do something. The
questions that arise from such wording are many, including but not limited to the
following: Was Powell, in fact, ‘‘practically ordered’’ to use the word ‘‘genocide,’’ and did
he cave in to the pressure or act the part of the ‘‘good soldier’’? Or was the analysis of
the data collected by the ADT persuasive ‘‘enough’’ that Powell felt comfortable using
the word ‘‘genocide’’ of his own accord? Or was the analysis of the data persuasive
enough that Powell did not feel guilty using the word ‘‘genocide’’ when all but ordered
to do so? The same sorts of questions, of course, are germane to his statement about the
United States’ not being obligated to do any more than it already had done vis-à-vis
Darfur.
Prunier concludes by asserting that ‘‘President Bush tried to be all things to all
men on the Sudan/Darfur question. Never mind that the result was predictably
confused. What mattered was that attractive promises could be handed around
without any sort of firm commitment being made. Predictably, the interest level of US
diplomacy on the Sudan question dropped sharply as soon as President Bush was
reelected.’’59 Prunier is certainly correct with respect to his comment about a lack of
‘‘firm commitment’’ being made in the aftermath of the determination. As for US
diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Darfur, they have actually waxed and waned time and
again over the course of the past year and a half. There have been spikes of interest
(most recently in pushing for the deployment of UN troops and NATO involvement in
Darfur), but there have also been mixed messages issued by Bush’s underlings in the
State Department (e.g., as to whether the situation in Darfur still constitutes genocide
and whether there is a need to push for tough sanctions on Khartoum and/or prod the
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UN to undertake an intervention). Ultimately, Prunier is correct in suggesting that
‘‘talk’’ over action has been the modus operandi of the Bush administration’s approach
to protecting the black Africans of Darfur.

Ramifications of the ADP
The development and implementation of the ADP, aside from the determination based
on the data collected by its team, has numerous ramifications. So too, of course, does
the genocide determination by the US government. As one might surmise, some are
positive and some are negative.
First, the development and implementation of the ADP set a precedent of sorts in
terms of the way in which an individual nation can develop and conduct an
investigation for the express purpose of attempting to ascertain whether genocide is
being perpetrated in some part of the world. Indeed, it proves that it can be done fairly
quickly, efficiently, and effectively and relatively inexpensively. That, in itself, is
significant, for far too often, in the past, individual nations, the media, human-rights
activists, and the international community have relied more on guesswork and
piecemeal information seeping in from different sources than on carefully collected and
analyzed data to ascertain the nature of a violent conflict.
Second, the precedent has now been established for an individual nation to conduct
an investigation into atrocities while they are being perpetrated for the express
purpose of ascertaining whether genocide has been perpetrated or not. While this may
appear to be of little note, it is nothing of the sort. If nothing else—and this is
significant—there is no excuse for nations with sufficient financial wherewithal to fail
to conduct such investigations when it appears that a situation may be spiraling
toward crimes against humanity or genocide. In other words, a new bar has been set in
making a genocide determination. Now it is up to citizens, human-rights activists,
NGOs, genocide scholars, and others to insist on such investigations.
Third, the ADP has provided a solid model for one essential component of an antigenocide regime. Such investigations should become an integral part of any
anti-genocide regime, and, thanks to the ADP, this is not a component that will
need to be developed from scratch. Given that the ADP was not perfect (but what is?),
developers of future investigations can learn from both the strengths and weaknesses
of the ADP.
As for the genocide determination, a precedent has been set in which one sovereign
nation (the United States) has accused another sovereign nation (Sudan) of
committing genocide while the atrocities were still ongoing. This, in itself, was a
historic event and thus significant. That is, the determination broke, if you will, a
certain taboo against individual nations’ making such an accusation when not only
justified in doing so but, if signatories to the UNCG, morally obligated to do so.
Be that as it may—and ironically and sadly—there is also the danger, as numerous
scholars and commentators have asserted, that, in the end, the genocide determination
by the United States could prove counterproductive. More specifically, the fact that the
determination was made and then the matter was simply and solely referred to the UN
Security Council does not bode well for those in favor of a proactive stance against
genocide. Indeed, the fact that the determination did not result in any concrete action
by the United States to attempt to halt the ongoing genocide may, in the short run (but
even here we are talking about throwing into the lurch precious and fragile lives of
untold numbers of people)—if not in the long run—result in minimizing the ‘‘weight’’
and significance of such a finding. That is, other nations and international bodies may
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now perceive such determinations simply a matter of course and of no great
consequence.
As the cliché goes, only time will tell. That said, de Waal makes the interesting
point that ‘‘although Colin Powell insisted the U.S. policy towards Sudan would
remain unchanged—thereby seeming to defeat the purpose of making the determination in the first place—there is no doubt that declaring genocide creates legal and
political space for intervention.’’60 It is still possible, of course, for a military
intervention to take place in Darfur. While most would agree that if an intervention
is eventually carried out it will have been horrifically late in coming, it is crucial to
recognize and appreciate the fact that some 2 million displaced persons are still at the
mercy of the GoS and the Janjaweed and are in need of all the help they can get in
staving off even more terror and mayhem. And if an intervention does take place, then
the genocide determination by the US may well have served the important purpose,
at least in part, of having ‘‘created the legal and political [and one might add, moral]
space’’ for doing so.

Conclusion
Aside from continuing to provide humanitarian aid, which was not, of course,
inconsequential, the only other major action that the United States undertook
following its determination of genocide was to refer the matter to the UN Security
Council. In doing so, it called for a more comprehensive study of the Darfur crisis. At
the time, many scholars and activists raised the issue of whether another study was
really needed, especially in light of the fact that no one—other than Khartoum,
perhaps—doubted that grave crimes against humanity had been perpetrated against
the black Africans in Darfur and that they continued to perish in huge numbers as a
result of the actions of the GoS and Janjaweed.
A question that has been asked by many, though it was largely rhetorical, was,
Did the United States actually do all it could? The answer was, and continues to be, an
emphatic ‘‘No!’’ Among some of the many options that the United States could have
pursued but chose not to—no doubt for reasons of realpolitik—were to push implacably
for a multilateral effort to establish a no-fly zone over Darfur, or do it alone; to apply
unrelenting pressure on the UN Security Council to establish a strong, mandate under
chapter VII of the UN Charter that would allow the AU troops (and others) to truly
protect the black Africans at risk; to apply equally unrelenting pressure on the African
Union to allow UN troops to join the AU forces in Darfur; to provide the AU troops and
recruits with top-notch training prior to their deployment to Darfur; to provide the
AU with ample military materiel and equipment, along with a guarantee of fuel and
personnel to service that equipment, such as four-wheel vehicles, planes, and so on,
instead of providing dribbles of military support; and to serve notice on Khartoum that
if it continued to interfere with or outright block humanitarian aid from reaching the
IDP camps, the repercussions would be serious—and then act on such notice in a
timely and effective manner. Noticeably absent from this list is the possibility of the
United States’ actually sending its own troops to Darfur, whether as a multilateral or a
unilateral effort, supported or not supported by the UN Security Council. Again, as
discussed above, this was never, at least as far as the Bush administration was
concerned, a real option. The point is, however, that there is plenty that the United
States could have done—and still should do—but it has not. And that is nothing short
of shameful.
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